Self-organisation of common good usage and an application to Internet services
Abstract
Natural and human-made common goods present key challenges due to their susceptibility to degradation, overuse, or congestion. We explore the self-organisation of their usage when individuals have access to several available commons but limited information on them. We propose an extension of the Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy for such systems, under which individuals use a resource iteratively until they are unsuccessful and then shift randomly. This simple strategy leads to a distribution of the use of commons with an improvement against random shifting. Selective individuals who retain information on their usage and accordingly adapt their tolerance to failure in each common good improve the average experienced quality for an entire population. Hybrid systems of selective and non-selective individuals can lead to an equilibrium with equalised experienced quality akin to the ideal free distribution. We show that these results can be applied to the server selection problem faced by mobile users accessing Internet services and we perform realistic simulations to test their validity. Furthermore, these findings can be used to understand other real systems such as animal dispersal on grazing and foraging land, and to propose solutions to operators of systems of public transport or other technological commons.