User Altruism in Recommendation Systems
Abstract
Users of social media platforms based on recommendation systems (RecSys) (e.g. TikTok, X, YouTube) strategically interact with platform content to influence future recommendations. On some such platforms, users have been documented to form large-scale grassroots movements encouraging others to purposefully interact with algorithmically suppressed content in order to "boost" its recommendation; we term this behavior user altruism. To capture this behavior, we study a game between users and a RecSys, where users provide the RecSys (potentially manipulated) preferences over the contents available to them, and the RecSys -- limited by data and computation constraints -- creates a low-rank approximation preference matrix, and ultimately provides each user her (approximately) most-preferred item. We compare the users' social welfare under truthful preference reporting and under a class of strategies capturing user altruism. In our theoretical analysis, we provide sufficient conditions to ensure strict increases in user social welfare under user altruism, and provide an algorithm to find an effective altruistic strategy. Interestingly, we show that for commonly assumed recommender utility functions, effectively altruistic strategies also improve the utility of the RecSys! We show that our results are robust to several model misspecifications, thus strengthening our conclusions. Our theoretical analysis is complemented by empirical results of effective altruistic strategies on the GoodReads dataset, and an online survey on how real-world users behave altruistically in RecSys. Overall, our findings serve as a proof-of-concept of the reasons why traditional RecSys may incentivize users to form collectives and/or follow altruistic strategies when interacting with them.